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ABSTRACT 
The increased extensive use of research reactors and improved regulatory and 
operational safety requirements have increased the use of more realistic simulations of the 
plant phenomena involved during steady-state and transient conditions. The earlier adopted 
conservative model assumptions in the reactor safety analysis which were based on 
conservatism are now been replaced with best-estimate methodologies. The best-estimate 
approach aims at providing a detailed realistic description of postulated accident scenarios 
based on best-available modelling methodologies and numerical solution strategies 
sufficiently verified against experimental data from differently scaled separate and integral 
effect test facilities. 
The core behaviour of Ghana Research Reactor one (GHARR-1) Miniature Neutron 
Source Reactor (MNSR) during the loss of flow has been investigated. Steady-state and 
transient analysis were done with best estimate code RELAP5/MOD3.3. The simulated 
transient characterizes a Loss-of- Flow-Accident (LOFA) type transient. The study forms part 
of the ongoing core conversion program that is currently ongoing at the facility to convert the 
reactor from highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium (LEU) fuel.  
Partial and total blockage of coolant to the reactor core transients were performed to 
study the behaviour of the reactor. It was observed in the case of partial blockage that 
although boiling occurred in the blocked channels, which lead to increase in both coolant and 
cladding temperature, the reactor presented a safer steady again due to in-flow of coolant from 
adjacent channels to the blocked channels. The calculations showed that cladding and coolant 
temperatures of blocked channels are below the melting point of the assembly. For total 
blockage the calculations ended abruptly at about 70 s after the start of transient. Therefore 
we could not observe the whole transient but the observed phenomena indicate unsafe 
behaviour of the reactor. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The continuous interest in commercialization of nuclear research reactors has led to 
consideration of their corresponding safety issues. Safety analysis of research reactors 
highlight on scenarios which can affect the safety of the plant. It is based on simulations of 
selected accident scenarios identified by the licensee through experience, from the vendor or 
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events from similar reactors. The thermal-hydraulic analysis is considered as an essential 
aspect in the study of safety of nuclear reactors, since it can predict proper working 
conditions, steady-state and transient, thereby ensuring the safe operation of a nuclear reactor 
[1][2]. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) recommends that simulations are 
performed using validated nodalizations and internationally recognized verified and validated 
(V&V) codes. Thermal-hydraulic (TH) Best Estimate (BE) system codes are capable of 
providing more realistic information on the status of the plant, allowing better prediction of 
the real safety margins.  
A number of System Thermal-Hydraulic (SYS-TH) codes, such as RELAP5, ATHLET 
or CATHARE, have been widely used in nuclear reactor safety analysis. The SYS-TH code 
RELAP5 was developed to simulate transient scenarios in nuclear reactors such as PWR, 
BWR, VVER, etc. Only a handful of work has been done on research reactors to access the 
applicability of the code on operating conditions[3][4]. 
SYS-TH code RELAP5 solves eight field equations for eight primary independent 
variables: pressure, two phases (i.e., one for liquid and one for vapour) specific internal 
energies, vapour volume (i.e., void) fraction, two phases velocities, non-condensable quality, 
and soluble component (e.g., boron) density [5].  
The widespread research reactors in the world, and the safety concern of them, has 
necessitated the use of more realistic simulations of the phenomena involved during steady 
state and transient conditions and to be able to study the design and identify the safety 
requirements which needs to be relaxed or improved [6][7]. 
Removal of heart from the core of a reactor is very crucial phenomena that need much 
analysis. The inadvertent loss of coolant flow to remove the heat generated in the core may 
cause by factors such as pump or valve failure, core blockage or redistribution of coolant. 
Each of these phenomena can lead to unsustainable over heating of the fuel cladding and can 
eventually lead to core melting. The probability of occurrence of such accident (eg. core 
blockage) depends on the design of the reactor core coolant flow whether upward or 
downward flow. 
The objective of this paper is to open a case for critical study of the behaviour of MNSR 
nuclear research reactor after a partial and total blockage of its coolant channels with best 
estimate code RELAP5 model. It is also to support the regulatory decision for approval of 
license for the ongoing safety analysis of reactor core conversion project. 
2 DESCRIPTION OF THE EXPERIMENTAL FACILITY 
2.1 Description of GHARR-1 
The Ghana Research Reactor – 1 (GHARR-1) is a Chinese Miniature Neutron Source 
Reactor (MNSR). It is a low power research reactor with thermal power of approximately 30 
kW.  
The reactor is fuelled with U-Al alloy with a U-235 enrichment of 90.2%, and it has 
only one control rod. It is cooled by natural convection. As part of the ongoing global effort to 
convert research reactors from highly-enriched uranium (HEU) to low-enriched uranium 
(LEU) fuel, the GHARR-1 fuel will be replaced with a core consisting of uranium dioxide 
(UO2 clad with Zircaloy-4 alloy) fuel pins with a nominal enrichment of 12.5 % and with 
maximum thermal power level of 34 kW to achieve the same flux for its utilization. Main 
characteristics of GHARR-1 are shown in Table 1 [8].  
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Table 1: The main parameters of GHARR-1 MNSR 
Parameter HEU LEU 
Reactor type, rated thermal power (kW) Pool-tank, 30 Pool-tank, 34 
U-235 enrichment (%) 90.2 12.5 
Core shape Cylindrical Cylindrical 
Core diameter (cm) 23 23 
Core height (cm) 23 23 
Fuel element shape Thin rod Thin rod 
Fuel element number in the core 344 348 
Fuel/Cladding material  U-Al alloy/ Alalloy (Al-303-1) UO2/ Zircaloy-4 
Fuel rod Diameter (mm)  4.3 4.3 
Fuel Length (mm) 230.0 230.0 
No. of fuel rod positions 350 350 
No. of dummy elements/thickness (mm) 6/0.6 2/0.6 
Dummy element material Al Zircaloy-4 
Material of control rod guide tube Al Zircaloy-4 
As shown in Figure 1, fuel pins are arranged in 10 multi-concentric circle layers with 
the pitch distance of 10.95 mm. Due to the physical core design characterized by under-
moderated system, a large negative temperature feedback coefficient of reactivity is achieved. 
The core region of GHARR-1 is located 4.7 m under water, close to the bottom of a 
watertight reactor vessel. The quantity of water is 1.5 m3 in the vessel, which serves the 
purpose of radiation shielding, moderation and as primary heat transfer medium. In addition, 
heat can be extracted from the water in the vessel by means of a water-cooling coil located 
near the top of the vessel. The water-filled reactor vessel is in turn immersed in a water-filled 
pool of 30 m3 [9]. 
 
Figure 1: Schematic Diagram of GHARR-1 
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2.2 Heat Removal from the Core of GHARR-1 
The heat generated by nuclear fission is conducted through the fuel meat to the fuel 
cladding, and transferred to the coolant by convection. Cold water is drawn through the inlet 
orifice by natural convection. The water flows between the fuel elements and comes out 
through the core outlet orifice. The hot water rises to mix with the large volume of water in 
the reactor vessel, and to the cooling coil. Heat is transferred through the walls of the 
container to the pool water. In Figure 2 it can be seen how heat is removed from the core and 
the heat transfer mechanism. The core inlet flow orifice slows down the natural circulation of 
fluid through the core.  
2.3 Description of the Transient  
The IAEA has described channel blockage as a transient event with different 
characteristics depending on direction of coolant flow. Downward cooling flow can lead to 
blockage due to objects dropping into the pool. Upward cooling flow can lead to blockage due 
to objects inside the primary cooling system piping being dragged into the core by the action 
of the pump [1]. In this paper two different transient events related to TH channel blockage 
have been investigated using RELAP5/MOD3.3 best estimate code. The core configuration of 
the GHARR-1 MNSR as depicted in Figure 2 has an upward flow. The probability of fuel 
swelling to block the channels in this case is higher than a material falling into the pool to 
block the channels [10].  
 
Figure 2: Schematic diagram of natural convective flow of coolant water within the reactor 
vessel and enlarged view of fuel element. 
3 THE CODE AND NODALISATION 
In this study, it has been assumed that the code has fulfilled the validation and 
qualification process and a “frozen” version of the code has been made available to the final 
user. This means that the code user did not modify or change the physical and numerical 
models of the code. In order to represent the GHARR-1 MNSR by the RELAP5 MOD3.3 
code, the nodalisation developed by the Argonne National Laboratory was modified to 
include all the 10 coolant channels and their corresponding heat structures. 
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To perform this type of transient simulation, a qualified nodalisation of the MNSRP of 
GHARR-1 reactor was developed. The nodalisation includes the whole MNSR system: the 
core, the vessel, and the surrounding pool as well as the reflectors. Ten coolant channels that 
represent the whole core were modelled, as shown in Figure 3. 
In order to simulate actual situation, cross flow was used since it provides coolant 
redistribution from adjacent channels after the channel blockage. 
 
Figure 3: RELAP5 nodalisation of GHARR-1 
4 ANALYSIS OF RESULTS 
4.1 Steady-state Calculations 
Steady-state calculations were performed to show that a stabilized input and boundary 
conditions for the transient calculations were achieved. It can be observed in Figure 4 that rod 
surface temperature (RST), fluid temperatures and the development of mass flow rate 
resulting from the natural circulation during operation at normal reactor power of 34 kW 
steady-state conditions are met. The simulation was considered at a constant nominal power 
of 34kW. The inlet pressure is kept constant by the Time Dependent volume (TDV) 
component modelling the condition of gas accumulator at the top of reactor vessel which is 
under atmospheric pressure.  
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Figure 4: Steady State 
4.2 Transient Analysis 
The analyses of transient "core blockage" have been divided in two; partial and total 
blockage. As depicted in Figure 1 and Figure 3, ten coolant channels that represent the whole 
core were modelled. The first case was simulation of partial blockage where six channels 
representing 35% (first six channels 1-6) of normal flow area were blocked. The second was 
an extreme condition where a total blockage (i.e. 100% blockage of normal flow) was 
considered. 
4.3 Partial Blockage 
A summary of RELAP5 calculation results for blocking six channels representing 35% 
of normal flow area is given in Figure 5 - Figure 8. The transient began at 800 s of calculation 
time with blocking the mass flow in six selected channels, as it can be seen in the Figure 5. 
The core configuration is such that the ten coolant channels are interconnected hence fluid can 
flow through from adjacent channels. There was a mass flow from adjacent channels to the 
blocked channels which made the flow continue again. It was observed in the calculation that 
after around 50 s of the start of transient, situation has been stabilized at the new values.  
The cladding temperatures in the blocked channels increased after the start of the 
transient because of the reduced coolant flow in the channels. At about 830 s of the 
calculation the cladding temperatures stabilizes till the end of the calculation, as shown in 
Figure 6. Furthermore, the reduced flow in the blocked channels causes an increase in the 
coolant temperature as depicted in Figure 7. 
Figure 8 shows the void fraction of the upper volume of the obstructed channels with 
subsequent void production in the upper volumes of the blocked channels indicating boiling 
in the blocked channels.  
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Figure 5: Mass flows in the 
blocked channels 
Figure 6: Cladding temperatures of the 
blocked channels 
 
Figure 7: coolant temperature Figure 8: Void in the blocked channels 
4.4 Total Blockage 
For total blockage transient all ten cooling channels were blocked at 800 s of calculation 
time, after the steady-state conditions had been achieved. Calculation stopped at about 870 s 
since the pressure and temperature went out of the code calculating boundaries. 
As shown in Figure 9, the mass flow rate, after the start of transient reduced to zero. 
This fast loss of flow through the core due to total blockage of all the channels lead to a rapid 
coolant temperature as shown Figure 10.  
Figure 11 shows cladding temperature in which the temperature increases with 
oscillations. The calculations stopped at about 70s after the start of transient. These conditions 
resulted in production of vapuor in the core which can eventually cause dry out in the coolant 
channel as it can be seen in Figure 12. 
 
Figure 9: Mass flows in all channels Figure 10: Coolant temperatures at 
top of the channels 
209.8 
Proceedings of the International Conference Nuclear Energy for New Europe, Portorož, Slovenia, September 14  ̶  17, 2015 
 
Figure 11: Cladding temperatures 
in all channels 
Figure 12: Void fractions at bottom of 
channels 
5 CONCLUSION 
This study investigated total and partial core coolant blockage transient of GHARR-1 
with a validated SYS-TH code RELAP5/MOD3.3. The simulated transient characterizes a 
Loss-of- Flow-Accident (LOFA) type transient. For partial blockage transient, reduction in 
mass flow shortly after the start of transient causes an increase in coolant temperature in the 
blocked channels leading to void formation. Although boiling occurred in the blocked 
channels, the reactor conditions stabilized at values that are within required safety margins 
due to in-flow of coolant from adjacent channels into the blocked channels. The calculated 
cladding and coolant temperatures of blocked channels are below the melting point.  
On the other hand, we could not observe the whole transient of total blockage due to 
stop of the calculation before the end. The observed phenomena during the total blockage, 
such as increase in temperature resulting in the coolant boiling in the core shortly after the 
beginning of the transient, indicate unsafe behaviour of the reactor.  
Therefore, based on the calculation it can be concluded that natural circulation is 
capable of cooling the reactor at 35% blockage without posing any significant threat to the 
fuel material integrity from the temperature point of view. In conclusion channel blockage 
needs proper attention in safety evaluation of this RR and proper actions should be taken  
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